








Hungary is a land-locked small country located in East-Central Europe, in 
the Carpathian basin. Its area is 90.530 square kilometres, mostly suitable 
for agricultural production. The country is relatively poor of mineral 
resources due to the lack of mountains, moreover its known natural gas and 
oil reserves were exhausted during extensive production periods between 
1930 and 1970. Its population was 9.778.371 inhabitants in 2018, out of 
which 18.9 % was aged less than 15 years and 14.5% – over 65. Total 
population increased until 1980 and peaked with 10.71 million. Since then 
the country witnessed declining demographic trends and constant aging of 
the population that was only partially balanced by immigration. Most 
people live in towns (71.06 % in 2017), but the country has only one real 
metropole, the capital city Budapest (1.756 thousand inhabitants, together 
with its suburbs cca. 2.300 thousand). The main economic and political 
process in the country after 1990 was transition from centrally planned 
economy to market economy. This process fundamentally influenced 
business conditions, macroeconomic performance, institutions and the way 
of life in the country.  
1. Political context and quality of institutions  
Transition to market economy enjoyed widespread social and political 
consensus during the 1990s in Hungary. Therefore, the establishment and 
reintroduction of liberal market economic institutions as well as a 
democratic political system was rather quick and straightforward. The 
achievements in the process were earmarked by Hungary’s accession to the 
OECD (1996), NATO (1997) and the European Union (2004). The country 
gained also economically from the systemic change: the level of GDP 
increased very significantly between 1995 and 2007. The robust 
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development process lost steam already before the 2008 crisis and 
recovered only slowly.  
In the transition process of the 1990s, Hungary has become a fully-fledged 
market economy with institutional system comparable to the classic 
continental model of capitalism. It can be noted that the institutional 
background has not been imbedded deeply in the society and also the 
democratic political system elements remained fragile. Hence, with the 
world wide advance of state capitalism (Musacchio, Lazzarini 2014; Nölke 
2014) Hungary’s democratic political institutions as well as liberal market 
economy structures were rolled back considerably after the 2008 crisis 
(Voszka 2013). Thus, the concept of competition state (democratic 
competition in politics, free market competition in the economy) was 
pushed to the background (Szanyi 2016). These changes diverted the 
country’s development path from the set of transatlantic models described 
by the well-known contributions of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
literature (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001; Amable 2003; Nölke and 
Vliegenhardt 2009) towards a system which resembles the Latin-American 
clan state model. (Phillips 2004). The current Hungarian government made 
efforts to change some elements of the international environment too, 
especially within the EU institutions. The most recent worldwide advance 
of state capitalism supported these ambitions by certain parties and 
governments not only in “classic” etatist regimes like Russia, but also in 
other EU member states (Poland, Italy, France). 
Hence, the Hungarian variant of capitalism is a rather peculiar hybrid that 
also changes over time rather quickly. The basic market economic 
institutions are present but since the rule of law is weak, their effect is very 
limited. This gives way to a new type of crony capitalism. The process of 
Hungary’s sinking down to political and economic chaos that was 
experienced in many countries of Latin America is nevertheless blocked by 
several factors. Firstly, Hungary became a workbench of the European 
economic space, most importantly of Germany. Germany can effectively 
press the Hungarian governments not to go too far in rolling back liberal 
economic institutions that would endanger German economic interests. 




signed many of the important treaties that constitutes the EU’s acquis. 
Thirdly, political rent seeking is bound to a properly performing income 
generating economy. Rolling back of market economic institutions could 
seriously endanger dynamism of the economy which can become fatal if 
external growth sources (EU-transfers, FDI) dries up. In this sense, the 
Hungarian model is a symbiosis of the FDI-led economic model and a 
crony model of capitalism.  
This process is reflected in deteriorating regulatory efficiency, increasing 
corruption, declining rule of law, suppressed voice and accountability. 
Institutional shortcomings of Hungary’s development deteriorated most 
recently. Five out of six aggregate measures in World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators show decline between 2000 and 2017. Voice and 
accountability declined from 85th to 58th position (on the scale 1 – worse to 
100 –  best). This is a clear reflection of the authoritarian measures of the 
Hungarian government after 2010. Government effectiveness changed 
from 82 to 70, regulatory quality from 83 to 73, the rule of law from 81 to 
70, control of corruption from 78 to 59. After steady decline from 78 to 69 
in 2012, the measure political stability and absence of violence indicator 
improved to 74. While even the lower values of the measures are above 
average (over 50), the trend is rather worrying. There is a rapid decline of 
governance quality in Hungary despite of EU membership. In fact, the 
Hungarian government’s most recent policies openly query the importance 
of many values reflected in the good governance indicators. Thus, even if 
unintended, the deterioration is triggered in many cases by government 
action.  
2. General economic outlook 
Economic growth of the country was significant after the period of 
transition crisis. Between 1990-1994, the level of cumulative GDP dropped 
by 30%, and the economy recovered to the pre-transition level only in 1998 
(Kornai 1994). The then achieved relatively high growth rates (2-5% GDP 
growth) could not be maintained throughout the 2000s mainly due slower 
growth in the main trading partner of the country (Germany) and the 
mounting government debt that called for austerity measures in 2006-7. 
This together with the negative effects of the global financial crisis in 2008 
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resulted in negative growth in 2009 (-6.6%) and also in 2012 (-1.6%). 
Thereafter economic growth was significant ranging between 2.1% (2013) 
to 4.9% (2018). Average GDP growth between 2010-2017 was 3.1% 
compared with the 2.1% average growth rate of the EU28. This was 
achieved with the help of successful macroeconomic policies and the 
significant stimulation effect of financial transfers from the European 
Union. But the 10-year average growth rate was only 1.0% in 2018 
(reflecting also the impact of the 2008/9 crisis).     
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Hungary’s relative level of development (GDP per capita) almost doubled 
from its lowest level in 1993. Yet, it is fairly low compared to the average 
of the EU28. It was 61% in 2006 and increased to 68% by 2017 (Eurostat) 
mainly due to above average economic growth but also due to declining 
population figures (smaller denominator). 
 
GDP/capita (USD, PPP) 
 
Industrialisation up till the 1990s and deindustrialisation afterwards shaped 
the economic structure of Hungary. The role of agriculture in employment 
declined from post second world war levels to 5.4 % in 2018. The low 
employment level together with relatively high agricultural output 
indicates increased productivity in the branch which is due to concentrated 
land ownership and up to date technological levels. Deindustrialisation was 
deepest in the transition crisis period (1990-1994). The liquidation of 
obsolete industrial capacities was only partially offset by new industrial 
investments carried out mainly by foreign companies. Employment in 
industry reached 26.9% in 2018 showing a 2% point increase over the low 
of 2012. The increase was also due to reindustrialisation efforts taken by 
the Hungarian government. The 2018 67.7% level of services (private and 
public) employment reflects the results of many post-transition processes: 
a quick recovery of the previously underdeveloped personal services sector, 
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the penetration and aggressive expansion of multinational services firms, 
strong specialisation of the labour force on low-end business services (call 
centres). Significant part of the GDP is realised in net goods and services 
exports. From 2007 onwards but especially after 2009, Hungary achieved 
substantial surpluses in the trade balance. Trade statistics show a very high 
level of openness of the country. Among the EU28, Hungary had one of 
the highest share of exports and imports as percentage of GDP (86.5% and 




Labour market conditions have been regarded as rather flexible in Hungary. 
For many years also wage costs were low, and the rather quick rise in labour 
productivity produced falling unit labour costs in the country, especially 
during the 1990s. After the year 2000 and especially after the EU accession 
wages started to increase in real terms. The process was also intensified by 
negative demographic changes, aging and significant outmigration. After 
2010, labour shortage emerged in various market segments, most 
importantly in blue collar manufacturing employees (skilled workers). In 
response to changes in the labour market Hungarian government decided 
in 2018 to amend laws regulating employment conditions. Employers were 
entitled to increase possibilities of overtime work hours with relative minor 
excess compensation (Slave Law). The new regulation called for protest 
demonstrations. Also, major strikes were launched in some important 
industrial facilities (Hankook, Audi) that were successful and could enforce 




The share of wages in GDP was 36.3% in 2017. All employee 
compensations plus employer’s social contributions made up 50.7% 
(Eurostat). The flexibility of the Hungarian labour market was largely 
achieved due to the weakness of labour organisations in the country (they 
were slashed on political reasons during the early years of the transition 
period). The trade union density rate was a mere 12% in 2010, and the share 
did not increase significantly ever since. The potentially accessible labour 
force could be increased in labour shortage situation by an increase of the 
activity rate to 71.2% by 2017. Also, unemployment rate went back to an 
all-time low level of 3.7% which is probably below the natural rate of 
unemployment. The significant reduction was achieved through the 
introduction of social works in the most depressed rural regions. This 
construction cannot be treated as regular employment but rather as social 
aid. Very much worrying is the total slowdown of productivity growth in 
Hungary. Between 2010 and 2018 labour productivity increased only 
slightly by 5.5% while all other transition economies scored double digit 
figures, many of them over 20-30% (Eurostat). This figure clearly shows 
that economic progress stalled in Hungary. No new, more productive 
investments were carried out and we can suspect that unproductive 
employment forms are also reflected in this figure. Last, but not least, the 
quality and skill ability of the employed might have deteriorated too. 
Significant outmigration occurred after the labour market liberalisations in 
more developed EU countries luring away rather the competent workforce 
especially in the blue collar segment. Estimations count with 300-500 
thousand active people to move, and there is another significant share of 
the population in Western Hungary that commutes mostly to jobs in 
Austria. 
Dynamics and structural development of the Hungarian economy was 
largely determined by the new role of the country in international labour 
division controlled by multinational corporate networks. The Hungarian 
economy was successfully integrated in global world economy. Yet, the 
process was rather extensive, quantitative: existing production input 
sources were reorganised in new global business models based mainly on 
the usage of available unskilled labour. Hungary has been regarded as a 
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classic example of dependent market economy (Nölke and Vliegenhart 
2009): dependent from multinational business decisions. 
3. Quality of entrepreneurship 
The four decades of communist rule and central planning exercised a deep 
impact on social attitudes to and experience with entrepreneurship. 
Hungary was called the showcase country of the communist bloc. This 
meant a relatively loose Soviet control over the economy. Hungary was 
simultaneously also a test lab of economic and social reforms in the soviet 
bloc. Starting as early as in 1968, Hungarian governments experimented 
with economic reform initiatives in order to introduce performing price 
system, collective and personal incentives and more direct links to the non-
communist world economy. However, these reform steps did not change 
the basic character of the economy. 70-80% of production remained under 
direct government control and central planning. Prices and salaries were 
also largely kept under control. During the 1980s, Hungary accumulated a 
high foreign debt.  
Yet, under the debt pressure Hungarian government made new efforts at 
improving economic performance of the country in 1988. Key market 
economic institutions were introduced in the legislative: Company Law and 
Commercial Law were passed, two-tire banking system was created, price 
and wage controls were eased. These changes in the legal system proved to 
be important drivers of the transition process already in 1989 (privatisation 
through asset tunnelling) and in 1990 when the first free elections were held 
and the first government of the new Hungarian Republic was formed. High 
foreign debt, accumulated experience with some market economic 
institutions, corporate managers’ contacts to Western businesses were the 
main determinants of the transition policies of the new Hungarian 
government. Another important driver was of course the international 
advising community. 
Hungary applied the gradual approach in the transition process (Roland 
2000). There was no big bang. Priority was given to speedy institutional 
development, the creation of basic market economic institutions. At the 




the micro level that could also contribute to the reversal of the 
transformational recession and the macroeconomic stabilisation of the 
economy (Szanyi 2016). The establishment of credibility of economic 
policy and breaking the inherited paternalistic linkages of firms to polity 
was also high priority (Szanyi 2002). Hence, microeconomic 
transformation was urged in several ways. The government decided to slash 
company and market subsidies from 1992 onwards. Liberalisation 
measures were introduced relatively quickly, price control was lifted 
almost entirely, imports were liberalised rather quickly, exclusive business 
licenses were withdrawn.  
The quickly intensifying pressure of competition was not accommodated 
by any measures (e.g. by currency devaluation), companies were 
encouraged to solve their problems through the privatisation process, 
mainly relying on foreign companies’ investments. Thus, privatisation 
policy preferred sales to foreign investors and FDI was encouraged also by 
many other advantageous regulations. At the same time companies were 
legally forced to manage the new challenges. Unfortunately, the “supply 
side shock therapy” called for a massive wave of bankruptcies (Szanyi 
2002). Approximately one third of the previous state ownership stock was 
eliminated, a further one third was privatised to foreign companies. The 
remaining stock either was kept in state ownership or privatised through 
other tools (vouchers, employee-management buyouts, insider actions).  
Against this background it is not very surprising that the entrepreneurial 
class has not been particularly strong in numbers or in skills and capacities 
up till the 2000s. Several studies confirmed these deficiencies (Laki 1994, 
2002; Stark and Vedres 2012). Instead of technological and business 
innovations Hungarian entrepreneurs continuously put efforts in 
accumulating network capital: good connections with policy makers. 
Instead of targeting economic rents stemming from innovation and 
leadership they concentrate on rents stemming from political connections 
(Kolosi and Szelényi 2010; Laki 1994, 2002). Therefore, analytical 
measures of entrepreneurship are fairly disappointing and show no sign of 
improvement in Hungary.     
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The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) provides a rather mixed 
picture about the conditions and capabilities of entrepreneurship in the 
country. The GEM spider chart shows that the level of physical 
infrastructure is ranked highest (around 4 on the 1-5 scale), and this is equal 
to the regional average, meaning that East-Central Europe has an overall 
good quality infrastructural background. Adequate levels were shown in 
higher level entrepreneurial education (with numerous internationally 
recognised universities and business schools), commercial and legal 
infrastructure and internal market dynamics. Entrepreneurial finance 
received somewhat lower score but was still very much in line with the 
regional average score. Going backwards on the ranking we see internal 
market burdens and entry regulation and R&D transfer at even lower level 
and below the regional average. The worse performing features with 
figures around grade two and below regional average scores were 
government entrepreneurship programs, governmental policies both from 
the aspects of support and relevance moreover taxes and bureaucracy. The 
bad scores of the three government policy related indicators calls attention 
to serious problems in formulating coherent and supportive strategy for 
business and entrepreneurship promotion. But the situation is even worse 
in the case of social and cultural norms which is in connection also with the 
complete lack of entrepreneurial education at the school stage.   
On the list of WEF’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) Hungary scored 
48th out of 140 countries. The ranking has improved from the low 62nd 
position in 2008 steadily, mainly because of improved macroeconomic 
indicators (rank 115th out of 134 countries in 2008 and 43rd of 140 in 2017). 
The other main pillars of the GCI did not change so dramatically, and they 
are roughly at the level (usually somewhat below) of the high-income 
group average or the Europe-North-America average. In pillar 1 
(institutions) “efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations” is 
ranked 134 (from 140!), but several other measures were over 100: 
“judicial independence”, “property rights”, “conflict of interest 
regulation”. Burden of government regulation scored 95, future orientation 
of the government 96. Thus, several key institutions especially in the area 




performance. Some other relatively weak points of Hungarian 
competitiveness were also shown in pillar 6 “Skills”.   
The business freedom measure of Heritage Foundation declined in 
Hungary most recently (2019). Now the country is only moderately free 
and countries like Kosovo and many others are ahead of it. The score is 65. 
Especially telling is the explanation of the decline. “Hungary made 
important reforms from a centrally planned to a market-driven economy, 
but the government has become more interventionist in recent years. The 
government plans to use sectoral taxes to manage the budget deficit and 
public debt to avoid renewed European Union sanctions under the EU’s 
excessive deficit procedure. Systemic economic challenges include 
pervasive corruption, labour shortages driven by demographic declines and 
migration, widespread poverty in rural areas, vulnerabilities to changes in 
demand for exports and a heavy reliance on imports of Russian energy." 
These are the most important flaws and challenges. 
4. Modernisation based on FDI 
During the mid-1990s up till the 1996/7, sale of public utility service 
networks and commercial banks FDI penetrated the Hungarian economy 
through privatisation deals. The modernisation of the newly acquired 
facilities soon begun, and the improved performance of firms was also 
reflected in more macroeconomic stability and economic growth (Szanyi 
2016). Thereafter also major greenfield FDI projects were launched. 
Capital investment activity in the country became increasingly controlled 
by multinational companies’ local affiliates. Complete new industries were 
established (electronics, automotive). On the other hand, many of the 
traditional flagship branches and firms of Hungary shrunk or disappeared 
providing much fuel to intense discussions even many years later. Hence, 
the restructuring process established facilities that were shaped in the then 
already prevailing GVC concept of labour division. This meant that 
Hungarian affiliates carried out only certain segments of the production 
process and were highly specialised mainly on labour intensive activities. 
The country’s main FDI attraction potential was access to cheap skilled 
labour force alongside with opening up new market potential (Nölke and 
Vliegenhart 2009). Thus, by the year 2000 Hungary became leader in FDI 
 76 
attraction in East-Central Europe and accumulated a rather significant stock 
of FDI.  
After conducting a substantial amount of research on FDI and the work of 
multinational firms in Hungary, most researchers reached a kind of general 
consensus in the issue. Firstly, FDI and foreign penetration in the transition 
process was not only unavoidable, but definitely the best option to restore 
competitive economic structures in the economy. Hungary’s economy 
became highly competitive internationally. On the other hand, Hungarian 
business could not keep pace with this quick development, due mainly to 
its own shortcomings and the counterproductive regulatory system that did 
not support its effective modernisation in times of increased competition. 
Hungarian capital owners were crowded out from big business. Therefore, 
today there is no match or adequately strong counter weight in the 
economy: large parts are dominated by multinational companies (Szanyi 
2016). According to data included in UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 
the officially registered share of FDI in total fixed capital formation ranged 
between 7 and 38% in the period after 1990 up till 2018. The total stock of 
inward FDI of Hungary was 22.870 million USD in 2000 and 93.332 
million USD in 2017 (UNCTAD). By 2017, Hungary also increased its 
outward FDI stock from 1.280 million USD to 28.611 USD.  
During the 2000s this leader role faded out with the advance of investments 
in other countries of the region. Hence, the Hungarian economy lost 
somewhat in dynamism. Due to opportunistic behaviour of the various 
governments in this period foreign debt started to accumulate again, growth 
was fuelled by state-sponsored private and public consumption. Another 
feature was the increasing direct influence of succeeding Hungarian 
governments over the economy. Partisan firms participated in public 
procurement tenders enjoying unjust advantages in the procedure. Also, 
market regulation changed several times favouring political insiders. To 
some extent re-nationalisation also occurred in order to support certain 
political goals (e.g. slashing public utility prices). These tendencies 
intensified after the 2004 accession to the European Union, and especially 
after the 2008 crisis (Szanyi 2016). Most recently, the still considerable 




applications to various EU funds provided stimulating cash transfers to the 
tune of around 5% of the GDP. FDI promotion was spread to expansion of 
already existing facilities that maintained investment momentum of the 
foreign-owned sector of the economy. Thirdly, despite of long-term 
development and economic stability risks many policies of the current 
government successfully stabilised the economy. Also political stability 
increased. 
Concerning financial sector data, we can see that Hungary has a continental 
type system with a strong influence of commercial banks and relatively 
weak capital markets. The stock market capitalisation was only 12.31% of 
the GDP (2015), and there are only a handful of listed companies in the 
country. The security market is dominated by government papers. The level 
of domestic savings has increased significantly after 2010 from 26% to 
30.36% of the GDP in 2017. This may give some credit to the National 
Bank’s conversion plans. The stock of domestic credits to private sector 
declined greatly between 2010 to 2017 from 60.8% to 33.4% of the GDP 
(Hungarian National Bank data). The reduction of private sector debt was 
achieved mainly by the write-offs of non-performing foreign currency 
mortgage loans held by the banks. After the 2008 crisis and the rapid 
appreciation of the Swiss franc, a big share of the mortgage loan stock 
failed causing serious tensions in the banking sector but also creating 
political debates over the case. Because of the political importance of the 
issue the Hungarian government provided assistance to cover the costs of 
the elimination of the bad loans.  
The figures show that investments do not use up all of the private savings, 
thus, there is a significant amount of liquidity that can be channelled 
towards government securities. The investment rate was 22.41% in 2017. 
Just like it is usual in the German type economic model, banking sector’s 
overall economic influence is also supported by a high concentration ratio. 





5. Knowledge sector 
Dynamic efficiency and future growth potential can be evaluated with an 
overview of the situation of innovation and entrepreneurship. Science and 
education has enjoyed high priority in Hungary during the late 19th and 
early 20th century. At that time compulsory primary education was 
introduced, some universities enjoyed worldwide reputation due to their 
scientific activities (Nobel Prize winners). The soviet-type political and 
economic system eliminated the incentives and decimated the financial 
resources especially for high quality scientific research. At the same time 
the US-led technology embargo cut off the country from vital technology 
transfers. Thus, science and education was weakened, though the basic 
infrastructure for high quality work remained in place. Unfortunately, the 
crony-type capitalist model that evolved after the 1990 political transition 
in Hungary did not increase incentives for developing the knowledge-based 
economy in the country. The quality of output in all levels of education 
started to decline. Business remained rather immune to innovations: the 
development of network capital remained the primary source of business 
development and not innovation (Laki 2002).  
The EU Innovation Scoreboard collects important comparative data (27 
indicators) about the quality of innovation infrastructure, innovation 
performance and innovation support. Hungary’s overall ranking declined 
very slightly between 2010 and 2017. The country was 21st of the EU 28 
and belonged to the low section of moderately innovating countries. Two 
measures have stood out permanently: employment in fast growing 
enterprises and medium and high tech product exports. This later indicator 
however does not really mirror high tech local value added: in many cases 
the low segments of high or medium tech production (e.g. assembly) is 
carried out by multinational firms’ affiliates in Hungary. In further two 
measures (international scientific co-publications and broadband 
penetration) Hungary could substantially improve its scores. At the same 
time, in half of the measures deterioration was observed. This was 
especially marked in the case of small firms’ innovativeness. R&D 
spending increased from around 1% of the GDP during the late 1990s to 




countries’ expenditure figures. The government’s new strategic plan targets 
2% R&D spending in the medium term.   
Despite of advances in some areas of digital economy and society (e.g. 
improved access to broadband infrastructure) Hungary is ranking rather 
low in the Digital Economy and Society Index (23rd out of the 28 EU 
member countries in 2018). The DESI Country Report also highlights 
improved connectivity in the country and also the resulting increased usage 
of internet services. Measures of both of these aspects are slightly above 
the EU average. However, in the three other dimensions Hungary lags far 
behind. The level of human capital (enabling knowledge and skills) is 
already significantly lower than the European average, but integration of 
digital technology and especially digital public services have dramatically 
low level. In case of digital public services Hungary is only 27th in the list 
of 28 EU member countries. This is despite of the effect of the National 
Info-Communication Strategy 2014-2020. Nevertheless, DESI improved 
also in Hungary from 35 to 45 between 2014 and 2018. 
Hungary is a moderately innovating country with some strengths and many 
weaknesses. Good quality education used to be one of the key factors of 
Hungarian success in the area, looking back to very significant government 
efforts during the modern history of the country. This system started to 
erode due to several reasons but mainly because of the lack of government 
attention. Hence, output from the various levels of education have sharply 
deteriorated during the past 20 years. Another weakness is the low level of 
interest in innovations, which has also been a problem already during the 
times of central planning and thereafter. The main problem is here the lack 
of stable economic and regulatory environment and cronyism that provides 
easier and more countable business options for entrepreneurs. Therefore, 
most indicators in this section are not very good, except of the share of 
high-tech exports (13.8% in 2017). This fairly high share is mainly due to 
multinational companies’ activity, but the real knowledge intensive value 
added content in this turnover may be significantly lower. R & D 
expenditure was 1.21% of the GDP in 2016, a figure mostly reflecting 
multinational firms’ local activity. Indigenous business has negligible 
share, and state’s share is also lower than in other countries, around 40% 
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of total spending. Public expenditure on education was 9.24% of the GDP 
and declining (true, school-age population is also falling), the higher 
education rate was 26% in 2016. 
6. Public opinion attitude towards transformations  
Hungary had been a reform-communist country during the 1970s and the 
1980s. The Hungarian “goulash communism” not only meant slightly 
higher living standards, but also relatively looser political and economic 
control. Some freedom of decision was provided to company managers, 
citizens were also allowed to travel or to launch small businesses. The 
experiments with “economic reforms” served as a social valve: Hungary 
became “the happiest barrack” in the communist camp. At the time of the 
political transition and throughout the 1990s, Hungary enjoyed the benefits 
of these premises. Hungary was the eminent scholar in the establishment 
of the structures of the competition state in the ECE region. The society 
hoped that the quick implementation of the institutions of the most 
competitive transatlantic capitalist models will catapult the country to 
similar levels of development very soon. At that time a kind of euphoria 
characterised the country, which was also fuelled by the newly won 
political independence and the strong support of advanced countries 
(mainly Austria, Germany and France in terms of economic integration and 
the US in entering NATO). This process clearly had a very strong political 
charge against the Soviet Union and later the Russian influence in the ECE 
region. This process was supported by strong consensus in the society and 
among political parties. 
Some details of the transition process were discussed already during the 
1990s. Right-wing politicians for example criticised the FDI dominance 
and the lack of effective support of the domestic business. The privatisation 
process stalled during the first Orbán-government (1998-2002), but by that 
time majority of state owned enterprises were either privatised or went 
bankrupt (Szanyi 2016). That government started to work against the Euro-
Atlantic orientation of the development path of the country. While 
cronyism during the 1990s targeted mainly the privatisation process, during 
the 2000s also parallel with the advance of EU-membership negotiations 




objective was to create partisan business in branches that received large-
scale cash transfers from the European Union (e.g. all types of 
construction). This process earmarked the policies of both left- and right-
wing governments, but was pushed to the extreme by the second FIDESZ 
government after 2010 (Szanyi 2016).  
Parallel with this political and economic process public opinion was also 
massively influenced by the governments and after 2010 by the 
government-controlled mass media. Consequently, public support of the 
flagship development projects (NATO-membership, EU-membership) lost 
substantial public support. Strong criticism of the European institutions and 
policies was very frequently supported by populist argumentations in the 
social campaigns that delivered massive support of the government’s 
domestic and international policies. A new element in this game of winning 
the sympathy of the public was the strong emphasis on xenophobic 
sentiments against refugees and migrants, and also against social and ethnic 
minorities. These campaigns changed the attitudes of the less educated 
social strata especially. The results of this campaign are clearly seen in 
changes of Eurobarometer survey results. The 2017 survey data indicated 
that Hungarian people are much more worried by immigration and 
terrorism than the European average (58 and 45% against 39 and 38%). 
These figures stand against the facts that after the really troublesome peak 
of immigration in 2015 the process lost steam completely (as the 
government argues, this is due to the successful countermeasures). It is also 
known that the majority of people scared of migration live in small villages 
and in the countryside, where basically no migrants were seen even in 2015. 
Another fact: the total number of terrorist attacks conducted by immigrants 
in Hungary was zero during the last 5-10 years. Surprisingly, trust in the 
European Union was higher in Hungary than in the EU on average (49% 
versus 41%). The same surprisingly high level of trust was shown towards 
the media in effective state monopoly (49%) and the Hungarian 
government (48%) (Eurobarometer 88). These figures show the deep split 
of the society: despite of rather obvious lack of tangible evidence in some 
public matters state media effectively influence the public opinion. As 
comparison, the first three worrying issues in 2004 were economic 
problems, terrorism was only 9th on the list (5% against the EU average 
 82 
16%). Trust in the EU was also much higher (64%) but not in the 
government (40%) (Eurobarometer 62).           
Conclusions 
The socio-economic model of Hungary is a mixed one. Loosely embedded 
market economic institutions provide a rather instable economic 
environment. This has negative effects on FDI and also on domestic 
business development. High and increasing political corruption requires 
capital owners to spend time and efforts with networking with government 
officials instead of increasing their competitiveness through new 
investments. The other part of the economy consists of highly efficient 
multinational affiliates. They have contributed to the overall modernisation 
process of the Hungarian economy. Unfortunately, their local 
embeddedness is not always strong. They moved substantial parts of their 
GVC-s to the country, but also the main suppliers are foreign owned. A 
relatively new problems is the lack of skilled labour. This shortage has also 
pushed up real wages. Consequently, price competitiveness of Hungarian 
locations has eroded. Due to lack of labour but also because of hostile 
policies of the Hungarian government confidence in Hungarian 
investments has eroded. Economic growth was maintained through strong 
growth effects of EU transfers. Unfortunately, the transfers have only 
temporary stimulation effect. Mainly because they are spent on the 
development of infrastructure which only has indirect and lagged longer 
term growth effects besides the current spending effect. It is rather 
worrying that the economy and social system of the Hungarian crony 
capitalism undermines also the institutions which are important for long-
term development. Education, national health system, is deteriorating very 
quickly. The mounting problems are also reflected in the still rather modest 
but significand outmigration and worsening demographic trends.   
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